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jurisdiction pursuant to the Order of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah dated June
22, 2004, transferring this case from the Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals
pursuant to I J.C.A. Section /5-~ M>I.
ISSI JES PRESENTED ON APPE \ I
1.

Whether the District Court correctly interpreted the Agreement and

specifically the interpretation of paragraph two (2) of the Agreement and its relationship,
or lack thereof, to paragraph three (3) of the Agreement, relative to the meaning and
purpose of the protection period clause,
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The trial court's interpretation of a contract, including questions not requiring

correctness. Ihis Court also reviews for correctness the trial court's grant of summary
judgment pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) and affords no deference to its legal
conclusions. Green Rnct cancu ,
Zion >s FU st Nt it B 15 • .,

, .
' '

.
<"»•"",

...

: _ u. , and

' • • ' • ^ W ) When a trial

court's findings arise_from "stipulated facts" such findings : L t ! = taiitamount to conclusions
of law, with the stipulation of facts being the functional equiv alent of true findings of
fact.

5

DETERMINATIVE LAW
1•

Contract Interpretation

- Fairbourne Commercial v. American Housing, 94 P.3d 292 (Utah 2004).
-Green River Canal Co., v. Thayn* 84 P.3d 1134, 1140 (Utah 2003).
-Winegar VFroerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991).
-Zion 's First Nat. Bkf v. Nat. Am. Title Ins., 749 P.2d 651, (Utah 1988).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case. The nature of the case is a contract dispute involving the
interpretation of a listing agreement relative to liability for a claimed commission owed
to the realtor.
Course of Proceedings. This action was precipitated by the filing of a complaint by
Tom Heal Commercial Real Estate, Inc. (Hereinafter "Heal"). Heal's Complaint alleged
among other things, breach of contract by Defendants, Glen Overton (hereinafter
"Overton") and Zion's Holding Company, L.C., (hereinafter "Zions") a Utah limited
liability company. The scope of these proceedings may be separated and identified in
three separate phases as follows. (1) Litigation on allowance/disallowance of the
underlying claimed commission to Heal, (2) the premature filing of a notice of appeal by
Heal prior to the resolution of issues relating to allowance of attorney's fees, and (3) the
appeal of the trial court's decision granting the motion to dismiss and allowing attorney's
fees.
Zion's responded to Heal's Complaint by filing a motion to dismiss (hereinafter
6

"Motion") on or about October 1 , 2003 I leal • : pp < : sed Zion' s Motion by filing a
riitTii(iii,,iiniiiiiiiii in npp<v;iliim (lirrriMiifln "Rrsponsv") thind
Affidavit of Tomas W. Heal. (Hereinafter "Heal Affidavit").

,i i:uni|MMiril \\\ il In
Thereafter, Zion's filed its

Reply Memorandum to Plaintiffs Response to Zion's Holding Company, L.C.'s Motion
to Dismiss. (Hereinafter "Repl>

• lcican^i, > ,^ai tiled a "Surreply ' ^. ^ww ± K-pu.

Z i o n \ I 111 en ni I'll Il it Reply In Foal's Sunvply linn!1 llin iiiiulfH

is sell I i In MMMI , lllin

December 12, 2003. 2
Disposition Below. The District Court granted Zion's Motion. The gist of Zion's
Motion was that there was relationship betwtx.. r ^. -grapiik - x nroK^aye r ce

3

(Protection Period) inasmuch as the latter specifically references the former in the Listing
Agreement & Agency Disclosure, (hen HI ill i "Agreement"). The interpretation of that
Agreement and these two clauses is at the heart of tin* appea* Zion ^ argued that the
Pioux i •

P u i u t l \ L i ! i M In ill I in i
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to protect Heal's right to a commission for a finite period of time-i.e., two (2) years after
the termination of the Agreement. Since the Agreement had expired on its own terms, no

Zion's Reply raised new issues outside of the Motion and both counsel
a g r e e c l t 0 i i ^ f|ij n g 0 f the Surreply in order that the Motion and all issues related ther^ •»
be considered and resolved in one hearing.
Prior to the hearing of the Motion on December 12, 2003, Heal filed a
Motion to Serve Summons and Complaint on Defendant Overton Pursuant to Rule
4(d)(3)(c). (Hereinafter "Heal Service Motion"). The Court heard oral argument on the
Heal Service Motion which had been briefed and granted it. The Heal Service Motion is
largely irrelevant to the issues on appeal
7

commission was owed. Heal's interpretation of the two clauses, on the other hand, was
that such a commission was owed in perpetuity anytime there was a "lease renewal."
Following the Court's decision on the Zion's Motion, Zion's filed an affidavit
seeking attorney's fees and costs as allowed by the Agreement. The Affidavit of Steven
F. Allred in Support of Fees and Costs (hereinafter "Allred Affidavit") was filed on or
about January 14,2004. A hearing was conducted by the Court on the Allred Affidavit
on April 22, 2004. At the conclusion of the hearing the Court granted the fees and costs
requested in the Allred Affidavit ($5061.00) less $493.00 dollars. The Allred Affidavit
was supplemented in the amount of $2,426.50 for fees and costs incurred by Zion's in
seeking and obtaining dismissal of a premature notice of appeal filed by Heal.3 It was
further supplemented in the amount of $1276.00 in preparing Findings of Fact
(hereinafter "Findings") and Conclusions of Law 4 (hereinafter "Conclusions") filed by
Zion's for a total award of $8,270.50.

3

Heal filed his first Notice of Appeal on or about January 9, 2004-nearly
three (3) months prior to the hearing on the issue of attorney's fees. On January 14, 2004,
Zion's counsel corresponded with Heal's attorney and provided authority for his position
that the appeal was premature and requested dismissal. 2'ion's request went unheeded by
Heal. Zion's filed a motion to dismiss in the District Court and at the Court of Appeals in
response to the latter's Sua Sponte Motion for Summary Disposition. On February 20,
2004, the Court of Appeals dismissed Heal's first appeal,
4

Zion's spent considerable time preparing draft findings of fact and
conclusions of law subsequent to the April 22, 2004, fee hearing. The parties, after much
discussion, including the input of the trial court judge, stipulated to the Findings and
Conclusions and certified the same.

8

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

/ i o n mi ni I III ni II ni II il I ni ni ni 1 Ill In i I ni mi II ni 11, I n i t t i [ X i i i ) , si p u n i l r m i d i l l . I n n I III in i l ;

members and validly formed on or about February 2, 1997. See Addendum attached
hereto. (Findings, Paragraph 1).
2.

On or about Junc ^N * y99, Heal prepared and Zion's executed a

a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "B."(Findings, Paragraph 2).
3.

The Agreement identifies "the Seller" as "Glen Overton\ and his

interests."(Findings? Paragraph 3).
4.

.t. -ii,

-

1

(

-

':..!;

-V

n • [imp

°"

ending on September 23,1999. (Hereinafter "the Listing Period").(Findings, Paragraph
4).
5.
Heal>* 7 ^
6.

Para-i.. r .
"

-

mandau

"lease" or "lease renewal."(Findings, Paragraph 5).

Paragraph 3 in the Agreement provides for protection of payments to Heal

under the Agreement for a period of twenty-four months (hereinafter "the protection
pern II I I lull

iiii|» the cApii.idiioii

Il III

'Vgireiiiciil (Nrplnnlin

1

\ 1000) ( F i n i l n i p

Paragraph 6).
7.

On or about July 30, 1999, Heal provided Zion's with a tenant, Selnate

U.S.J I. Co I tcL, for a three (3) year period. (Augu .
8.

-•

n >. _ , : aiagiaj

Uiii \ I in miI I1! Mini / iinii - executed n soronrl I rase A preernent

9

(hereinafter "lease renewal") for a period of two (2) years.(Findings, Paragraph 8).
9.

Heal demanded a commission from Zion's for the lease renewal and

Zion's refused to pay said commission on the basis that the lease renewal was entered
outside of the expiration of the Agreement and the protection period. (Findings, Paragraph
9).
10.

Defendant, Glen Overton, (hereinafter "Overton") an individual and

member of Zion's resides outside of Utah and has been properly served in this
action.(Findings, Paragraph 10).
11.

Zion's has submitted the Affidavit of Steven F. Allred in Support of Fees

and Costs (hereinafter "Affidavit").(Findings, Paragraph 11).
12.

The Affidavit requests fees and costs in the amount of $5061.00 in

conjunction with Zion's motion to dismiss and in opposition to Heal's motion to effect
service on Overton by federal express up through and including January 7,
2004.(Findings, Paragraph 12).
13.

The Affidavit has been supplemented orally and informally by Zion's in

the amount of $2, 426.50 for fees and costs incurred with respect to the filing of the
premature notice of appeal by Heal and for services incurred in conjunction with the
amendment of these findings and an order of the Court through April 22, 2004.
Additional fees have been incurred in obtaining entry of an order.(Findings, Paragraph
13).
14.

Zion's corresponded with Heal on two separate and distinct occasions
10

and attempted unsuccessfully to persuai
--

u.

... .,ompiami ana appeal or i isk
v

i i b l r Ini t n \ s iiiiiiiill c o s t s pin 1111in

*

'^ ^7-56

k

bindings,,

Paragraph 14).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
l l h ' I "I .Inin I l ml pinpi'il i i n t n p i e t n l llir Agivemrnl in i niil.iin

ilh

established I Jtah precedent relating to the interpretation of a contract. Thereafter the
parties stipulated to appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law. Sin 1
interpretation, among other things, includes a dete
Agrei iiiinili I ilrUMinim

IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIMIIIIIIIIIIIIII

the four corners of the

, i I iiiiiiiill, iiiiiili

the plain meaning of the words utilized by the drafter and avoidance of harsh
interpretations or rewriting or supplying missing terms. Based on consideration of all of
the above, without need or resort to extrinsic evidence, uic Uibinci . . ... t was correct in
\l%i-

'

.

•

'

' • «*nn i

•,

-neti lity

to Heal on any lease renewal.
ARGUMENT
Heal's Interpretation oi Hie Agreeium
Established I,egal Precedent in the Sia

"'

kv

Hh
Contract

Interpretation.
^
The Distru'l

^—*-**

Interpretatl ci n in U t a h in Genei al

iiiiiiii nun ill l l r n n t n il 1,11111 1 ippinpriiilt tiKilysis in finding .uid

concluding that the Agreement is not ambiguous by looking at the four (4) comers of the
11

document, that there is no need to resort to extrinsic evidence, that contract provisions
within the Agreement are to be harmonized together, and interpreting the Agreement so
as not to yield inequitable results. See Green River Canal Co., v. Thayn, 84 P.3d 1134
(Utah 2003). The District Court's Conclusions, Paragraphs 4-7 identify and contain the
proper analysis. Conversely, Heal's interpretation of the Agreement is inconsistent with
such analysis.
In Fairbourne Commercial v. American Housing, 94 P.3d 292 (Utah 2004) the
Utah Supreme Court coincidentally examined a similar listing agreement between a
broker and a vendor. The broker sued the vendor to recover a commission. The trial
court interpreted the listing agreement and found that the vendor owed the broker a
commission. The vendor appealed. On appeal the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed the
correct analysis when interpreting a contact as a matter of law. The Court stated:
When interpreting a contract, a court first looks to the contract's four comers to
determine the parties' intentions, which are controlling. If the language within
the four comers of the contract is unambiguous., .a court determines the parties'
intentions from the plain meaning of the contractual language as a matter of
law... A contract provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one
reasonable interpretation because of 'uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms,
or other facial deficiencies...When interpreting a contact a court is to consider each
provision in "relation to all of the others, with a view toward giving effect to all
and ignoring none. (Emphasis added).
Fairbourne at 295 citing to Bakowski v. Mountain States Steel, Inc., 15 P.3d 1179 (Utah
2004); Winegar VFroerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991) (quoting Faulkner v.
Farnsworth 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983); Green River Canal Co., v. Thayne, 84
P.3d 1134 (Utah 2003).
12

B.

Heal Concedes that The Agreement is Unambiguous and
Therefore Resort to Extrinsic Evidence is Unnecessary

Heal's contract interpretation analysis as gleaned from Appellant's Brief is at odds
with the correct analysis as discussed above for several reasons. First, Heal states "[t]he
above two conclusions of law ["Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Conclusions of
Law Paragraph 7"] are in error and are inconsistent with the clear meaning and
unambiguous language of the contract." (Emphasis added). (Appellant's Brief, at p. 16).
Furthermore, Heal's introductory phrase to his ARGUMENT, 1A. states: "The Plain
Meaning of the Listing Agreement Controls." (Emphasis added). (Appellant's Brief, at p.
18). Accordingly, Heal's position is and must be that the Agreement is unambiguous.
Heal further argues that the Agreement must be given its "plain meaning."5
Therefore, Heal apparently does not challenge or dispute Conclusion, Paragraph 5
[Only when an ambiguity exists which cannot so be reconciled may resort be had to
extrinsic evidence, i.e., the affidavits of Tom Heal relating to the intent of the parties prior
to execution of the Agreement and the purpose of the a protection period].6 Heal has

5

The meaning attributed to a document (usu. by a court) based on a
commonsense reading of the words, giving them their ordinary sense and without
reference to extrinsic indications of the author's intent. -Also termed ordinary meaning.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 995 (Seventh ed. 1999).
6

If this is indeed Heal's position, then the BRIEF FOR AMICUS CURIAE
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS AND UTAH ASSOCIATION OF
REALTORS (hereinafter "Amicus Brief) is superfluous and so is any discussion by Heal
in his Brief as to the purpose of the protection period because it is extrinsic evidence.
(Appellant's Brief, at pp. 20-23).
13

never argued and does not now argue that the District Court should have found that the
Agreement is ambiguous.7 Therefore, the District Court need not resort to any extrinsic
evidence to determine the parties' intent. On the contrary Heal relies upon and uses such
language as "the Listing Agreement plainly states.../' (Appellant's Brief, at p. 18) "...but
is governed by the clear language found at the end of Paragraph 2," (Appellant's Brief, at
p. 17) "Paragraph 2 of the Listing Agreement clearly states..." (Appellant's Brief, at p.
17), "...the Listing Agreement clearly mandates...,) (Appellant's Brief, at p. 17).
C.

HeaPs Interpretation of the Agreement Fails to Consider and
Harmonize Sections 2 and 3 in the Agreement

The second reason that Heal's analysis of the interpretation of the Agreement is
flawed is that it fails to harmonize appropriately paragraphs 2 and 3 in the Agreement.
Correct contract interpretation requires that a court "...consider each contract
provision...in relation to all of the other with a view toward giving effect to all and
ignoring none." Green River Canal Co,, v. Thayne, 84 P.3d 1134, 1141 (Utah 2003). The
first source of any inquiry when a question arises is the document itself which should
be looked at in its entirety and in accordance with its purpose and all of its parts should
be given effect insofar as that is possible. Larrabee v. Royal Dairy Products Co., 614
P.2d 160 (Utah 1980); Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City, 740 P.2d
7

"A contract provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one
interpretation because of 'uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial
deficiencies.'" Fairbourne, at p. 293 citing to Winegar V Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104,
108 (Utah 1991). Heal makes no assertion that the Agreement is ambiguous.
14

1357 (Utah App. 1987); GGA, Inc. v. Laventis, 773 P.2d 841 (Utah App. 1989). A
contract should be interpreted so as to harmonize all of its provisions. Jones, v.
HinUe, 611 P.2d 733 (Utah 1980).
Appellant's Brief and HeaFs contract analysis ignores this step. Nowhere in his
Brief does Heal address the interrelationship of and specific reference to Section 2.
Brokerage Fee in Section 3 of the Agreement, (3. Protection Period. "...Seller agrees to
pay to the Company the brokerage fee stated in Section 2...") with the payment of a
commission. Nowhere in Heal's Brief does he discuss the meaning and relationship or
duration (i.e., "twenty-four months") of the protection period except to state that it is a
"...separate concept..." (Appellant's Brief, at p. 20). In fact, Heal fails to even mention
the specific reference in the latter clause to the former in the Agreement except as alluded
to in the District Court's Conclusion, Paragraph 5. (Appellant's Brief, at p. 19). Heal
simply relies on the expressed purpose of a protection period as outlined and explained in
the Amicus Brief. (Appellant's Brief, at p. 19).8 Heal's analysis violates the Utah
Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement to (1) [fully] consider each provision and
(2) "ignore [ing] none." Fairbourne, at p. 295. Heal completely ignores this specific

8

Heal's analysis focuses solely on the language in Paragraph 2. Brokerage
Fee in the Agreement that a commission is owed "...on any and all lease renewals at the
time of such renewals...on the first day of the lease renewal commencement."
(Appellant's Brief, at p. 18). Amicus Curiae deals briefly but indirectly with the "twentyfour month" period. (Amicus Curiae Brief, at p. 9, footnote 1). However, the position of
Amicus Curiae ignores Heal's obligation to "expressly and unequivocally" so provide in
the Agreement.
15

reference and fails to consider, discuss or attempt to harmonize the same.
D,

The Purpose of the Protection Period is to Relieve Zion's of the
Burden of Paying Duplicative/Unearned Commissions

In Realty World Labrum v. Steadman, 131 P.2d 165 (Utah 1987) the Utah Supreme
Court considered the purpose of a protection period clause in a listing agreement. In
Realty, the vendor showed the home to the eventual purchaser. (Percival). Then the
vendor listed his home for sale with a broker. (Strout) The listing agreement expired by
its own terms. The vendor then listed the home with Realty World Labrum. (Hereinafter
"Realty"). The Really listing agreement did not relieve the vendor of a duty to pay Realty
a commission if Percival purchased the home. The Really listing agreement expired. The
vendor then entered into a second listing agreement with Strout. That listing agreement
contained a tailored protection period clause9 drafted by Steadman which the court found
and held created a "sham" transaction. Realty, at p. 167.
In Realty, the Court found that the purpose of a protection period clause is
"fashioned to relieve homeowners [and presumably Commercial Landlords-i.e., Zion's]
who list their property with a new agent at the expiration of an earlier listing agreement
from the burden of paying commissions [or a commission] to both the original and the

9

That clause was drafted specifically for the particular situation by the
defendant, Steadman, a sophisticated man who held " a doctorate in education and is
experienced in real estate transactions; he has successfully completed a real estate course
and has passed the test given by the state to persons applying for real estate licenses."
Realty, at p. 166.
16

new brokers." [Or to a broker whose listing agreement expires by its own terms absent
specific terms to the contrary.] While the Court in Realty found the drafting of the
protection period clause to be "poor" it was nevertheless proper for the Court to "give
effect to its obvious intent and purpose. Realty, at p. 176 citing Nagle v. Club
Fountainbleu, 405 P.2d 346, (Utah 1965) (holding that such a clause is not designed to
allow a homeowner to escape liability and payment of a valid commission by simply
waiting for the expiration of the listing agreement).10
E.

The District Court's Interpretation of the Agreement as Drafted
by Heal is Fair and Equitable and the Agreement Fails to
Expressly or Unequivocally Provide for the Payment of a
Commission in Perpetuity

The third reason that Heal's analysis of the interpretation of the Agreement is
flawed is
[W]here there is doubt about the interpretation of a contract, a fair and equitable
result will be preferred over a harsh and unreasonable one. And an interpretation
that will produce an inequitable result will be adopted only where the contract
expressly and unequivocally so provides that there is no other reasonable
interpretation to be given it. (Emphasis added).

10

The holding in Realty is based on unique facts not present in this appeal.
First, Zion's already paid Heal a commission. Second, the Agreement does not state and
cannot reasonably be read to state that a commission is owed in perpetuity on any lease
renewal. Third, there is no reason to believe that this transaction was a sham. The
Agreement expired by its own terms on September 23, 1999. (Findings, Paragraph 6).
The second lease was executed by Zion's on April 15, 2003-nearly nine (9) months after
expiration of the first lease. (Findings, Paragraphs 7-8).
17

Green River Canal Co., v. Thayne, 84 P.3d 1134, 1142 (Utah 2003). Assuming arguendo
that doubt exists with respect to the interpretation of the Agreement, Zion's dealt fairly
with Heal and paid a Heal a commission pursuant to the first lease agreement.
(Conclusion, Paragraph 1). Payment of a commission by Zion's is both fair and
equitable. However, nothing in the record or the plain meaning or language of the
Agreement suggests that Heal properly disclosed or bargained for a "commission in
perpetuity under the Agreement."11 Heal as the drafter of the Agreement is in a superior
bargaining position, and is held to a higher standard to insure that (a) the terms he wants
are in fact included within the Agreement and (b) that such terms are fully disclosed and
written clearly and concisely. See Conclusion, Paragraph 7. ("...Heal is the drafter of the
Agreement, any ambiguity is construed against the drafter").
Heal's interpretation of the Agreement, if adopted, would elicit an inequitable
result for the following reasons. First, the Agreement had already expired by its own
terms. Second, Zion's already paid Heal a commission. Third, there is nothing in the
record to suggest that Zion's acted in bad faith to avoid payment of an additional

11

Heal could have easily included language in the Agreement that a
commission is owed "...on any and all lease renewals [in perpetuity] at the time of such
renewals...on the first day of the lease renewal commencement." (Appellant's Brief, at p.
18). Even better, Heal could have eliminated any reference to the Brokerage Fee within
the Protection Period Clause or extended the protection period for a longer period or
indefinitely. Heal's language and characterization of Zion's obligation (i.e., to pay a
commission in perpetuity) is subtle at best!
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commission12 or engaged in a sham transaction. Fourth, and most importantly, contrary
to HeaFs assertion, if Heal failed to draft the Agreement in such a manner as to
"unequivocally" provide for a payment of a commission in perpetuity then Heal-not
Zion's, should bear the loss.
Both the Appellant and the Amicus Curiae argue that the District Court's
interpretation is at odds with the "industry-wide purpose of protection periods."
(Appellant's Brief, at p. 18; Amicus Curiae Brief, at pp. 8-9). Such argument misses the
point. Payment of a commission in perpetuity may have been HeaFs intent. However,
unless Zion's knew, understood and mutually assented (to an unequivocal written
expression of such intent) to payment of a commission in perpetuity under the
Agreement, then the standard in the industry is irrelevant. See Equitable Life & Cas. Ins.
Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187 (Utah App. 1993). Zion's position is that the Agreement is
unequivocal in stating that Zions is not obligated to pay a commission in perpetuity.
F.

The Court Cannot Change the Bargain Between the Parties on
the Basis of Supposed Equitable Principles

The fourth reason that HeaFs analysis of the interpretation of the Agreement is
flawed is "there is a long standing rule [of contract interpretation] in Utah that persons
dealing at arm's length are entitled to contract on their own terms without the intervention

12

In fact, there is nothing in the record or the findings to suggest that Zion's
was even aware that Heal claimed he was owed an additional commission, or that the
Agreement so provided, until the filing of the complaint on or about August, 2003-nearly
two years outside of the protection period identified within the Agreement.
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of the courts to relieve either party from the effects of a bad bargain." Hal Taylor
Associates v. UnionAmerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982) citing Biesinger v.
Behunin, 584 P. 2d 801 (Utah 1978). See also Tomino v. Greater Park City Co., 570 P.2d
698 (Utah 1977) (holding that a court will not rewrite a contract to supply terms which
the parties omitted) and Dalton v. Jerico Construction Co., 642 P.2d 748, 750 (Utah
1982) ( holding that "[I]t is not for a court to rewrite a contract improvidently entered into
at an arm's length or to change the bargain indirectly on the basis of supposed equitable
principles)." (Emphasis added).
Both Heal and Amicus Curiae improperly request that this Court change the
bargain entered into by the parties on the basis of supposed equitable principles,13 i.e., that
the parties' intent should be gleaned from and inserted into the Agreement by the Court
based on the standard in the industry. This Court cannot and should not write a better
contract than Heal himself wrote. See Rio Algom Corp. V. Jimco Ltd., 618 0.2d 497, 505
(Utah 1980). The Court cannot do for Heal what Heal himself failed to do. See Provo
City Corp., v. Nielsen Scott Co., 603 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1979). Heal agrees that "[t]he
district court cannot go back, rewrite the agreement...." (Appellant's Brief, a p. 18).

13

Amicus Curiae advance an additional and improper rationale for reversal of
the District Court's opinion based on the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment.
(Amicus Curiae Brief, at pp. 9-10). Unjust enrichment is one branch of the equitable
doctrine of quantum meruit. See Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356,1360
(Utah App. 1991). However, any recovery under a quantum meruit theory "presupposes
that no enforceable contract exists." Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah App.
1990). This Agreement is and has been enforced.
20

II

If this Court Reverses the District Court, Heal may be Entitled to an
Award of Attorney's Fees.

Zion's does not disagree that attorney's fees are available under the Agreement.
(Appellant's Brief, at p. 25). Similarly, Zion's does not disagree that a provision for
payment of attorney's fees in a contract includes attorney's fees incurred by a prevailing
party on appeal as well as at trial. (Appellant's Brief, at p. 25). Under any circumstances,
contingent upon a reversal by this Court of the District Court's interpretation of the
Agreement, any determination as to any amount of fees to which Heal is entitled
would be presumably determined on remand and only after entry of proper findings of
fact and conclusions of law.
CONCLUSION
The District Court's interpretation of the Listing Agreement as outlined in the
parties' and the Court's stipulated findings of fact and conclusions of law is correct. The
District Court's decision strictly adheres to established legal precedent in this state
regarding contract interpretation. Conversely, Heal's interpretation of the Agreement is
either inconsistent with or ignores such precedent. Heal drafted the Agreement and failed
to clearly express and unequivocally provide for payment of a commission in perpetuity
despite the alleged standard in the industry. Protection periods are to relieve
owners/landlords of the burden of paying commissions. If the Court were to adopt Heal's
interpretation it would effectively re-write the Agreement and protect Heal when Heal
failed to protect himself. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the District Court's
21

interpretation of the Agreement.
DATED this z^day of October, 2004.
LAW OFFICE OF STEVEN F. ALLRED, P.C.

Steven F. Allred
Attorney for Appellees
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ADDENDUM
Pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 24(a)(l 1) the District Court's
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are attached hereto.
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On Friday, December 12, 2003, a hearing and oral argument was conducted to consider two
ions, thefirst,a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant, Zion'sHolding Company, L.C, (hereinafter
>n's") pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) and (6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The second, a
ion to allow service by federal express filed by the Plaintiff, Tom Heal Commercial Real Estate,
(Hereinafter "Heal"). Steven F. Allred of the Law Firm of Steven F. Allred, P.C, appeared on
ilf of Zion's. Allan Walsh of the firm of McKay, Burton & Thurman appeared on behalf of Heal.
On April 22,2004, at 8:30 a.m., the Court conducted oral argument on the Fee Affidavit and
Objection. (Hereinafter "the second hearing"). The same parties appeared as in the first hearing
i the exception that Jeremy Sink, Esq., appeared for and in behalf of Allan O. Walsh. At the
fusion of the second hearing the Court verbally ruled on the Fee Affidavit. The Court granted
I'S Fee Affidavit in the amount prayed for in the Fee Affidavit less $493.00 related to Zion's
osition to serving Glen Overton via Fed Ex. On May 5, 2004, the Court conducted a telephone
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conference between the parties in which the Court directed the entry of a final judgment as to Zion's,
pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 54(b), because there is no just reason for delaying
Heal's appeal as to Zions, and the Court stayed any further action as to Overton pending the
resolution of the appeal. In conjunction with these motions and hearings, the Court enters the
followingfindingsof fact and conclusions of law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Zion's is a Utah limited liability company, separate and distinctfromits members

and validly formed on or about February 2, 1997. See Exhibit "A" attached hereto.
2.

On or about June 30, 1999, Heal prepared and Zion's executed a "LISTING

AGREEMENT AND AGENCY DISCLOSURE," (hereinafter "Agreement") a copy of which is
attached hereto as Exhibit "B".
3.

The Agreement identifies "the Seller" as "Glen Overton/and his interests."

4.

The Agreement provides for a listing period beginning June 23, 1999 and ending on

September 23, 1999. (Hereinafter "the Listing Period").
5.

Paragraph 2 in the Agreement mandates the payment of commissions to Heal by

Zion's for a "lease renewal."
6.

Paragraph 3 in the Agreement provides for a protection period to Heal

under the Agreement for a period of twenty-four months (hereinafter "the protection period")
following the expiration of the Agreement. (September 23, 1999).
7.

On or about July 30, 1999, Heal provided Zion's with a tenant, Selnate U.S.A. Co.

Ltd., for a three (3) year period. (August 1, 2002).
8.

On April 15, 2003, Zion's executed a second Lease Agreement with Selnate U.S.A.

Co. Ltd., (hereinafter "lease renewal"), for a period of two (2) years.
9.

Heal demanded a commissionfromZion's for the lease renewal and Zion's refused

to pay said commission on th^ basis that the lease renewal was entered outside of the expiration of
the Agreement and the protection period.
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10.

Defendant, Glen Overton, (hereinafter "Overton") an individual and member of

Zion's resides outside the state of Utah and has been properly served in this action.
FINDINGS OF FACT REGARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES
11.

Zion's has submitted the Affidavit of Steven F. Allred in Support of Fees and Costs

(hereinafter "Affidavit").
12.

The Affidavit requests fees and costs in the amount of $5061 in conjunction with

Zion's motion to dismiss and in opposition to Heal's motion to effect service on Overton by federal
express up through and including January 7, 2004.
13.

The Affidavit has been supplemented orally and informally by Zion's in the amount

of $2,426.50 for fees and costs incurred with respect to the filing of the premature notice of appeal
by Heal and for services incurred in conjunction with the amendment of thesefindingsand an order
of the Court through April 22, 2004. Additional fees have been incurred in obtaining entry of an
order.
14.

Zion' s corresponded with Heal on two separate and distinct occasions and attempted

unsuccessfully to persuade Heal to dismiss his complaint and appeal or risk being liable for fees and
costs pursuant to U.C.A. Section 78-27-56.5
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Notwithstanding the fact that the Agreement identifies "Glen Overton\AND HIS

INTERESTS" as the "Seller" the Agreement was implicitly ratified by Zion's by virtue of Zion's
payment to Heal of the commission associated with the execution of the lease between Zion's and
Selnate.
2.

On April 15, 2003, Zion's entered into a lease renewal with Selnate and such lease

renewal was executed outside of the listing period (September 24, 1999) and protection period
(September 24, 2001) of the Agreement.
3.

The interpretation of a contract is a question of law.

4.

The preliminary question in the interpretation of a contract is whether the contract
3

contains a merger provision. The Agreement does contain such a provision. Accordingly, the
presumption is that the Agreement represents thefinalexpression of the parties' intent.
5.

The next inquiry is to examine the Agreement as a whole and to determine whether

there is an ambiguity which cannot be reconciled by an objective and reasonable interpretation. See
Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 84 P.3d 1134, 1142 (Utah 2003)(citation omitted)(noting that"
we interpret "the terms of a contract in light of the reasonable expectations of the parties, looking to
the agreement as a whole and to the circumstances, nature, and purpose of the contract"). Only
when an ambiguity exists which cannot so be reconciled may resort be had to extrinsic evidence; i.e.,
the affidavits of Tom Heal relating to the intent of the parties prior to execution of the Agreement
and the purpose of a protection period.
6.

There is no ambiguity in the Agreement inasmuch as paragraph three (3) in the

Agreement specifically references paragraph two (2). When those provisions are harmonized
together, not read in isolation to one another as Heal asserts, it is clear that a commission is payable
by Zion's to Heal pursuant to the lease renewal only if it arises within the protection period which it
does not.
7.

Heal's interpretation of the Agreement and specifically the interpretation of

paragraph two (2) of the Agreement and its relationship, or lack thereof, to paragraph three (3) of
the Agreement is unreasonable. The Agreement does not provide for a commission payment in
perpetuity on any lease renewal. Such a commission is only due and owing if it arises within the
protection period specified in the Agreement pursuant to a lease renewal. Furthermore, inasmuch as
Heal is the draftor of the Agreement, any ambiguity is construed against the draftor.
8.

Service of Process by federal express on Overton is acceptable under the

circumstances and Heal's motion to serve summons and complaint on Overton pursuant to Rule
4(d)(3)(c) is granted.
9.

The Court will^treat Zion's motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment

under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. There are no genuine issues of material fact
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which are in dispute. As a matter of law the reasonable interpretation of the Agreement is that no
commission is owed by Zion's to Heal on the lease renewal because it arose, if at all, outside of the
protection period. Accordingly, the Court grants Zion's motion.
10.

The Court grants Heal's Motion to Serve Summons by federal express.

11.

The Court certifies this decision as it relates to Zion's Motion to Dismiss and the

Court's interpretation of the contract pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 54(b).
Certification under Rule 54(b) is proper because there are multiple parties to the action, the judgment
appealed from would be appealable but for the fact that Overton remains in the action and there is
no just reason for delaying Heal's appeal. There is no just reason for delaying Heal's appeal because
the other party to the action, Overton, is out of the country for an extended period of time on a work
project, resolution of Overton's potential individual liability under the Agreement would cause both
sides to incur further costs and attorneys' fees to conduct additional fact finding, and no just reason
exists to wait for Overton's return to Utah. Thus, no just reason exists for delaying Heal's appeal
as to the holdings in favor of Zion's and the propriety of certification under Rule 54(b).
12.

The Court hereby stays the prosecution of this action against Overton pending review

of the certified portion of this Order.
CONCLUSIONS REGARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES
13.

The Affidavit complies in all respects with Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure.
14.

The fees and costs sought by Zion's in the Affidavit ($5,061) were reasonable and

necessarily incurred by Zion's except for the amount of $493.00 for Zion's opposition to Heal's
motion to effect service on Overton.
15.

The fees and costs incurred by Zion's in defending against the filing of Heal's appeal

in the amount of $2,426.50 were reasonable and necessarily incurred by Zion's inasmuch as the notice
of appeal wasfiledprematurejy and was not an appealable,finalorder.
16.

The fees and costs incurred by Zion's in the preparation of the Order and these
5

Findings in the amount of $1,276.00 were reasonable and necessarily incurred by Zion's.
17.

Zion's made reasonable efforts to avoid incurring unreasonable attorney's fees and

costs in defending against the lawsuit and the notice of appeal. In exercising its discretion whether
to award fees and costs the Court takes into consideration a number of factors including but not
limited to the amount at stake, the underlying merits of the complaint and appeal, the equities of the
case and the law in Utah with respect to the prevailing party, including whether an award of fees and
costs should be done on a piecemeal basis (who won the battle versus who won the war).
18.

The Court certifies this decision as it relates to the attorneys' fees owed to Zion' s for

the same reasons as outlined in paragraph 11.
19.

Execution by Zion's on the attorneys' fees is stayed provided that Heal pays into the

Court's registry $9,000.00 or posts a bond in the amount of $9,000.00 pursuant to Rule 62(i) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure in conjunction
with anyfilingof a Notice of Appeal.
20. Pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Heal shall pay into the
Court's registry the amount of $7,500.00, or post a bond approved by the Court as security for costs
and attorneys' fees of the appeal within the meaning ofRules 6 and 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
DATED this^fyoTMay, 2004.

/S/DereK K Pultan
Honorable Derek P. Pullan
Fourth District Court Judge
Approved As to Form & Substance:

Allan O. Walsh/Jeremy C. Sink
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